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ABSTRACT
Although many developing economies are increasingly influencing the
global economy, China’s influence has been the greatest of these by
far.  Once hindered from competition by political and economic restric-
tions, China is now a major economic player.  As China’s economic
might has grown, so too has the demand for intellectual property pro-
tection for technologies originating from China.
In this article, we present a detailed empirical study of Chinese patent-
ing trends in the United States and the implications of these trends for
the global economy.  We compare these trends to patenting trends from
earlier decades.  Specifically, we compare Chinese patenting trends to
Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Russia, and India.  We study how patent
allowance rates for Chinese patent applications at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office have improved, and how these allowance
rates compare to allowance rates in earlier “boom” periods from other
East Asian countries.
While many believe that China is an exception in many respects, we
find that patents for innovations originating from China seem to track a
well-trodden path laid down by countries like South Korea in earlier
decades.  As a historical matter, we show empirically that China’s pat-
enting trend is not unique.  It is instead strikingly similar to the patent-
ing trends of other Far East Asian countries whose inventors have
applied for patents in the United States.  In other words, Chinese inno-
vation is moving up the value chain in product development much like
other Far East Asian countries have done in the past.  We also find that
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China appears to be setting itself apart from other BRICS (Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China, and South Africa) countries in successfully seeking
patent protection for technological innovation and in producing prod-
ucts with higher levels of technological sophistication and innovation.
Our empirical results can be largely explained by four factors.  First,
our work underscores the role of foreign direct investments by multi-
national corporations in China; foreign direct investments are a major
factor driving U.S. patent filings from China.  Second, Chinese govern-
ment policies have promoted patent protection and aligned Chinese
patent office procedures with the procedures of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office.  Third, investment in research and development in
China by both domestic and foreign entities has increased significantly.
Fourth, the Chinese government has committed to moving up the value
chain in products and services.
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INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, China has become a trail-blazing world economic
power in the early 21st Century.  Adjusting for purchasing power parity
(“PPP”), China’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita increased by
240% from 2000 to 2011. This growth has coincided with a significant in-
crease in demand for intellectual property protection on the Chinese main-
land, particularly for the patenting of new inventions.  Between 2000 and
2011, the number of patent applications from Chinese residents to China’s
State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”) skyrocketed from 25,346 to
415,829, increasing by an average annual rate of 29 percent.1  SIPO cur-
rently receives more patent applications than any other patent granting au-
thority, and 80 percent of all applications to SIPO come from Chinese
residents.  By way of comparison, slightly fewer than 50 percent of all appli-
cations to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) come from
U.S.-based inventors.2
This growth in patenting represents a new reliance on technological de-
velopment.  Large and medium-sized enterprises in high-technology indus-
tries have submitted patent applications to SIPO at an average annual growth
rate of 38 percent over the same period, increasing from 2,245 to 77,725.3
Technological development has also changed the way Chinese businesses
compete on the global stage.  Instead of relying solely on manufacturing, the
Chinese economy is growing and becoming more dominant through ad-
vancements in technology.
Thomas Friedman’s groundbreaking work, The World is Flat, described
how advancements in technology have increasingly globalized society and
the marketplace.  As technology “flattens the world,” allowing new players
to compete in the marketplace, three billion people who were once frozen
1. Statistical Country Profiles: China, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.ORG., http://www
.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/profile.jsp?code=CN (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
2. U.S. Patent Statistic Chart Calendar Years 1963 - 2014, UNITED STATES PAT-
ENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat
.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (showing foreign origin percent share in utility patent grants
by year).
3. 2012 Statistics Yearbook on High Technology Industry, CHINA NAT’L BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N & MINISTRY OF SCI. & TECH., http://www.stats
.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/html/U2054E.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). The high technology in-
dustries include the manufacture of medicines, aircrafts and spaceships, electronic and com-
munication equipment, computers and office equipment, medical equipment, and measuring
instruments.
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out of global competition are now able to enter the playing field.4  These
individuals were formerly blocked from competition because they lived in
countries with closed economies and strict, hierarchical political and eco-
nomic structures.
The Chinese people are among those now free to compete.  Because of
Friedman’s “triple convergence” (new players, on a new playing field, de-
veloping new technologies), China is becoming a major economic force.  No
longer forced to rely on “the ponderous deliberations of finance ministers,”5
Chinese patentees are free to make major impacts on the global economy
with their individual tech-based inventions.  Chinese influence will continue
to grow as international patent authorities increasingly approve Chinese pat-
ent applications and aid in the enforcement of Chinese patents.
Increased global competition means that patent systems all over the
world no longer operate in isolation.  Modern patent regimes emphasize in-
ternational harmonization of substantive rules by reaching across borders for
best practices and procedures.  Scholars like Graeme B. Dinwoodie recog-
nize the need for an international (or internationally minded) patent regime
in today’s global economy.6 Peter K. Yu chronicles the changes in the
American patent approach in light of the acceleration of globalization
brought about by modern technology.7  Yu notes that as the global economy
transforms, the United States has become necessarily more aggressive in
protecting its intellectual property internationally.8  Nevertheless, to stay
competitive in the global economy, the United States must not only protect
the innovations of U.S. inventors, but also the innovations of foreign inven-
tors.9  It is also in the nation’s best interests to help other countries adjust
their intellectual property regimes to bring them into line with that of the
United States.
The United States is not immune from this pressure to harmonize its
patent system, which has prompted changes in its patent system as well.  As
an example, consider its recent move from a first-to-invent patent system to
a modified first-to-file patent system.10 Before 2011, a dispute concerning
priority in the U.S. would be resolved in favor of the first inventor.  Most
4. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 211 (2007).
5. Id. at 214.
6. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellec-
tual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM & MARY L. REV. 771 (2009) (call-
ing for an improved private international property regime).
7. See generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Prop-
erty in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 131 (2000).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. John Villasenor, March 16, 2013: The United States Transitions to a ‘First-Inven-
tor-To-File’ Patent System, FORBES TECH. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2013, 11:54 PM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2013/03/11/march-16-2013-america-transitions-to-a-first-in-
ventor-to-file-patent-system/.
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other countries’ patent systems determine priority based on which inventor
was the first to file a patent application.  With the passage of the America
Invents Act (“AIA”), President Obama signed into law that crucial shift in
the U.S. regime.11  This change brings American patent law and patent pro-
cedures more in line with international approaches to patent law.12
Empirical work that studies the development and implications of the
trends in international patenting is limited. Existing work is generally lim-
ited to statistical data compilation collected for government agencies or
practitioners.13  This Article presents an empirical study of Chinese patent-
ing trends in the U.S. across several decades and uses three primary ap-
proaches to present a comparative analysis of these trends.
First, we compare current U.S. patenting trends from Chinese applicants
to the patenting trends from other Asian countries and to the patenting trends
from emerging BRICS economies (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa).14  The results indicate that, between 2000 and 2012, the
growth in U.S. patent applications from China greatly outpaced the growth
in applications from Japan, South Korea, and the other emerging economies.
Over this period, the technology mix (e.g., chemical, biological, computers,
mechanical) of Chinese patent applications in the U.S. weighted heavily to-
ward communications and computing.  There were similar results for patent
applications originating from the other BRICS economies.  Finally, from
2006 onwards, the allowance rate for Chinese applications began to con-
verge with the allowance rate for Japanese and South Korean applications.
11. Id.
12. Jessica C. Engler, Chinese Patent Innovation and Competition Under the America
Invents Act – A Whole New World of Prior Art, LA. STATE UNIV. J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES:
ENERGY LAW CURRENTS (Mar. 28, 2013), http://sites.law.lsu.edu/jelrblog/2013/03/28/chinese-
patent-innovation-and-competition-under-the-america-invents-act-a-whole-new-world-of-
prior-art/. Organizations including the Intellectual Property Owners Association unsuccess-
fully urged the shift to a first-to-file jurisdiction on the basis of global harmonization for
several years; the notion finally gained support and was included in the America Invents Act
once justified on the basis of job creation. Wayne C. Jaeschke et al., Comparison of Chinese
and U.S. Patent Reform Legislation: Which, If Either, Got it Right? 11 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 567, 573 (2012).
13. For other studies in this area, see e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 2013
World Intellectual Property Indicator, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941/
wipo_pub_941_2013.pdf; BAKER & MCKENZIE, Intellectual Property: Trends Around the
World (2012), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/North%20America/
IntellectualProperty/
Baker%20&%20McKenzie_Doing%20Business%20Globally_10.9.12_Track%20V_Final.pdf.
14. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 13, at 60. BRIC began as an acro-
nym used to refer to Brazil, Russia, India and China as similar emerging economies. FORUM-
BRICS, About Us, http://www.bricsforum.org/sample-page/ (last visited June 15, 2014)
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150628120040/http://www.bricsforum.org/sample-page/].
Since that time, these countries have formed an international association in the same name,
which was changed to BRICS when South Africa was included in 2010. Id.
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This convergence indicates an increase in the quality of Chinese
applications.
Second, we use historical data to compare the recent growth in Chinese
patent applications filed in the U.S. to similarly active periods of growth for
applications from South Korea and India during the late 20th century.  We
also use this data to consider the evolution of the technology mix and allow-
ance rates in each case over these periods of intense growth in patenting
activity.  The rates of growth for the South Korean and Chinese patent appli-
cations in the U.S. are strikingly similar, and both are much higher than the
growth rate of Indian applications.  As these results show, the growth in
applications from China is not unique historically, and Chinese patenting
appears to be following a strategy that has already been successful for other
large Far East Asian economies.  In this sense, our work suggests that China
is not an exception.  Rather, it is just the latest emerging high-tech super-
power following in the footsteps of Japan and South Korea.  That said, cur-
rent trends indicate that the increase of patent applications from Chinese
inventors will continue for a longer period than similarly observed techno-
logical booms in countries like South Korea.  International collaboration
may contribute to the longevity of the Chinese patent boom.  We observe
that the percentage of foreign co-inventors on Chinese patent applications is
much higher compared to South Korean patent applications from a compara-
ble period.
Third, we examine data on the influx of foreign capital into China.
These data show that Chinese patenting activities in the U.S. are spurred by
foreign direct investments (“FDI”) of multi-national corporations (“MNCs”)
in China.  What may have started out as an effort by MNCs to seek low-cost
manufacturing in China is now expanding to include more research and de-
velopment (“R&D”) activities.  In fact, China appears to be increasingly sep-
arating itself from other BRICS countries in pursuing technology innovation
and in seeking patent protection to bolster those R&D activities.
We explore trends in U.S. patenting by China and other BRICS nations
by examining relevant theories for explaining those trends, by quantitatively
analyzing those trends, and exploring their implications.  Section I of this
Article identifies current theories explaining the changing patent trends in
China and proposes hypotheses to explain these changes and the implica-
tions thereof.  The results suggest that Chinese technology is evolving at a
far faster rate than in other developing economies, including those with the
“triple convergence” advantage.  In Section I, we also attempt to determine
why China is experiencing patent growth at a rate much faster than other
BRICS economies.  Section II explains the study’s methodology—including
data selection and research methods—and the technology mix in patent ap-
plications and application allowance rates.  Section III presents the results of
the study, including patent applications, allowance rates, technology mix
concentrations, and the percentage of foreign co-inventors for Chinese pat-
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ent applications to the USPTO.  Section III also analyzes the geographic
distribution within China for Chinese patent applications and compares this
to the geographic distribution for patent applications within other emerging
and established economies.  In Sections IV and V, we draw implications
from our results and suggest how these data might augment further research.
I. HYPOTHESES
The underlying hypothesis of this Article is that a convergence of
unique factors such as population size, growth rate, and political history
makes China’s recent innovation boom different from any other technologi-
cal boom the world has experienced.15  After adjusting for purchasing
power, China overtook the United States as the world’s biggest economy in
2014.16  This economic growth coincides with rapid growth in the number of
Chinese patent applications received by the USPTO.  In light of this knowl-
edge, we examine whether China followed a historical pattern of develop-
ment in innovation or blazed an unprecedented trail. Other scholars, such as
Yue Zhang, Peter J. Williamson and Ram Mudambi, have also looked at this
increase and analyzed its implications.17  This Section explores China’s pat-
enting trends in light of its increased investment in research and develop-
ment by domestic and foreign entities, changes in the government’s agenda
and foreign policy, and increased exports of advanced technology products.
A. Investment in Research and Development
Many scholars point to the surge in Chinese R&D spending as a cause
of increased innovation and the influx of patent applications.18 The govern-
ment and multinational corporations are both sources of this increased
spending.  For instance, Huawei Corporation, China’s telecom giant, in-
creased R&D spending by more than 25 percent in 2012.19  Huawei holds
more than 50,000 patents worldwide.20  Another Chinese company, ZTE
Corp, spent $1.4 billion on R&D in 2012.21  ZTE led the world in number of
Patent Cooperation Treaty filings in 2011 and again in 2012, with more than
15. See infra note 26.
16. Mike Bird, China Just Overtook The US As The World’s Largest Economy, BUSI-
NESS INSIDER, (Oct. 8, 2014, 5:08 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/china-overtakes-us-
as-worlds-largest-economy-2014-10; China Set to Overtake U.S. as Biggest Economy in PPP
Measure, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 30, 2014, 3:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2014-04-30/china-set-to-overtake-u-s-as-biggest-economy-using-ppp-measure.html.
17. See infra notes 26, 33 & 35.
18. See infra notes 26 & 35.
19. Chris Neumeyer, China’s Great Leap Forward in Patents, IP WATCHDOG, (Apr. 4,
2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/04/chinas-great-leap-forward-in-pat-
ents/id=38625.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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3,900 applications in 2012.22  In total, China spends approximately $300 bil-
lion on R&D annually, second only to the United States in R&D
expenditures.23
The efficiency of China’s R&D spending in leading to patent applica-
tions provides further explanation for their exponential patent application
growth.  For every million dollars spent on R&D, Chinese companies apply
for 3.5 patents.24  American companies, by contrast, apply for 0.9 patents for
every million dollars spent on R&D.25  These patent application figures,
however, raise more questions than they answer.  For example, they do not
address whether patents based on these applications will ultimately be issued
or indicate the quality of those issued patents.  The “efficiency” in generat-
ing patent applications might be linked to the Chinese practice of turning out
innovative products faster and cheaper—but with less focus on quality—
than their foreign counterparts.26  If true, this would raise concerns about the
quality of the patents.
Alternatively, Chinese patent generation efficiency may not indicate
lower quality, but rather a different approach to patenting that focuses on
incremental innovations.  In Japan, for instance, it is a common practice to
patent smaller improvements in the underlying technology than would be
patented in the United States, where inventors often wait until the new in-
vention’s improvements over the old are clearer.27  If Chinese companies are
patenting incremental improvement, it may indicate a carefully considered
evolution of a technology rather than a rushed product.
Determining the extent R&D spending drives Chinese patent growth is
still a matter of debate among scholars. Professor Peter Yu contends that
China will become a larger presence in the intellectual property market be-
cause of multinational firms’ investment in China’s R&D facilities.28  It fol-
lows from this assertion that if multinational firms with a U.S. presence
continue investing in China, Chinese patent applications in the USPTO will
also continue to increase.  Other studies, however, have focused on patents-
R&D elasticity estimates and concluded that R&D spending “is unlikely to
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Peter J. Williamson & Eden Yin, Accelerated Innovation: The New Challenge from
China, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Apr. 23, 2014), http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/acceler-
ated-innovation-the-new-challenge-from-china/; see also DRUID, Druid Debate on Innovative
China, VIMEO, 07:05-10:00 (June 23, 2014, 8:40 AM), http://vimeo.com/98925171 (compar-
ing production timeline for Chinese iPhone equivalent).
27. Dan Rosen & Chikako Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual Property
Law, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 42-44 (1994).
28. Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMP-
BELL L. REV. 525, 552 (2012).
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be the primary driving force of China’s patenting boom.”29  Hu and Jeffer-
son suggest that the accelerated restructuring of state-owned enterprises and
increased privatization may be offer a better explanation for the upsurge of
patenting in China.30
Nonetheless, multinational enterprises and foreign investors deserve at
least partial credit for the Chinese patent boom.  The growth of FDI
prompted Chinese companies to file for more patent applications than they
previously filed.31  This increased international cooperation may contribute
to Chinese companies’ growing interest in protecting their intellectual
property.32
B. Government Agenda and Foreign Policy
Another contributing factor to China’s success is their government’s in-
tellectual property agenda.  The State Council adopted their National Intel-
lectual Property Strategy in June 2008, emphasizing the active development
of intellectual property in China.33  Government initiatives, like financial re-
muneration and tax breaks, reward Chinese inventors for filing patents both
domestically and abroad.34  One scholar, Ram Mudambi, cites the Chinese
government’s clear innovation plan and vision as factors that will set China
apart as the world’s leading innovative power by the year 2040.35
China’s innovation policy was accompanied by aggressive patent law
reform and, starting around 2008, the adoption of many practices similar to
those of the USPTO.36  China implemented additional regulations, including
more detailed filing instructions, in 2010.  These regulations are analogous
to the U.S. rules of practice in patent cases, which include detailed directions
that applicants and attorneys must follow in submitting applications.37
China also enacted patent examination guidelines in February 2010 that are
equivalent to the U.S. Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”).38
Part of the increase in Chinese patent applications before the USPTO may
therefore be a side effect of these reforms.  By making the SIPO application
process more similar to the USPTO application process, China made its in-
29. Albert Guangzhou Hu & Gary H. Jefferson, A Great Wall of Patents: What is Be-
hind China’s Recent Patent Explosion?, 90 J. DEV. ECON. 57, 64 (2009).
30. See id. at 64-65.
31. Id. at 64.
32. Id.
33. Yu, supra note 28, at 530.
34. Neumeyer, supra note 19.
35. DRUID, supra note 26, at 28:47-41:07. For other arguments for and against the
proposition that China will take over as the world’s leading innovative power by 2040, watch
the full debate.
36. Jaeschke et al., supra note 12, at 570.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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ventors more knowledgeable and better equipped to apply for patents in the
United States.
Several scholars assert that the influence of Western foreign policy led
to the Chinese government’s prioritization of intellectual property (“IP”)
rights.  After decades of battling with the U.S. and other trade partners over
lax enforcement of IP rights, it appears, at least with respect to patents, that
external influences have helped push Chinese policy towards alignment with
western IP systems.39  When the owners of foreign patents forced the Chi-
nese government to enforce their patent rights, domestic inventors began
seeking the same rights, contributing to greater rates of patenting by Chinese
nationals at home and abroad.
C. Increase in Chinese Advanced Technology Products (ATPs) Exports
Another explanation for the rapid increase in the number of patent appli-
cations from mainland China is an increase in patent-intensive advanced
technology products (“ATPs”). An increasing share of Chinese exports to
the U.S. are ATPs in sectors such as information and communication tech-
nology (“ICT”) and optoelectronics (see Figure A6 in Appendix).40  The
Foreign Trade division of the U.S. Census Bureau defines ATPs as including
products from high technology fields.41 Because one ATP may contain sev-
eral inventions, the production of ATPs is often considered a complex prod-
uct industry.  This is in contrast to discrete product industries, where the
output sold to the end consumer stands alone and is not a combination of
different products that may have been manufactured by someone else.
When exporting a computer, for instance, a large number of patent owners
will want the receiving country to enforce their rights.  On the other hand, a
39. Yu, supra note 7, at 136–54.
40. About 500 of some 22,000 commodity classification codes used in reporting U.S.
merchandise trade are identified as “advanced technology” codes and they meet the following
criteria:
• The code contains products whose technology is from a recognized high technology
field (e.g.), biotechnology).
• These products represent leading edge technology in that field.
• Such products constitute a significant part of all items covered in the selected classifi-
cation code.
This product and commodity-based measure of advanced technology differs from broader
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry-based measures, which in-
clude all goods produced by a particular industry group, regardless of the level of technology
embodied in the goods. The Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau assigns ATP
classifications. For the full list of classification codes, see Foreign Trade, U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/reference/codes/#atp (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
See also Alexander Hammer, Robert Koopman & Andrew Martinez, Overview of U.S.-China
Trade in Advanced Technology Products, 3 J. INT’L COMM. & ECON. 1, 7–8 (2011) (describing
the increase in Chinese exports of APTs to the U.S.).
41. Common Trade Definitions, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/reference/definitions/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
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pharmaceutical export would likely only concern a single entity and a single
patent owner.  The share of ATP exports (i.e., involving complex product
industries) from China increased from 16 percent in 2002 to 33 percent in
2012.42  Meanwhile, the ATP share of total exports to the U.S. fell for the
other BRICS, although the bulk of this decline occurred in Brazil and Russia
(see Figure A6 in Appendix).  Some point out that a large number of these
exports are merely processed in China, and therefore may not implicate in-
novations by Chinese inventors; but non-processing exports have also in-
creased.  In fact, China’s share of high and medium-high technology exports
grew by over 20 percent between 1997 and 2007.43
Chinese industry has shifted from discrete product industries toward
complex product industries.44  Operating in these complex industries brings
far greater incentives to patent, both to protect one’s own innovative prod-
ucts and to equip one’s firm with a complex patent portfolio for negotiation
purposes.45  Increased R&D and an influx of foreign capital contribute to the
growth of complex industries and to the increase in patent applications, as
discussed above.  A more educated population also provides additional
human capital to support R&D efforts.46  Demand-side drivers may cause an
increase in complex product industries that address specific challenges, like
pollution and high population density.47
42. The data used to generate the graph in Figure A6 can be found at Advanced Tech-
nology Product Data – Imports and Exports, ATP Group by Country, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/atp/select-atpctry.html (last visited
Nov. 30, 2015).
43. DRUID, supra note 26, at 39:00-40:00.
44. Javade Chaudhri, Chinese Industrial Policies: Indigenous Innovation, Intellectual
Property Rights, and the Trade Issues of the Next Decade, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 4-5
(2011).
45. Hu & Jefferson, supra note 29, at 58. Complex product industry actors tend to pro-
duce three times as many patent applications as discrete product industries. Id. at 61.
46. Riccardo Crescenzi et al., The Territorial Dynamics of Innovation in China and
India, 12 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 1055, 1058 (2012) (“Both India and, in particular, China have
invested heavily in innovation ‘inputs.’ Both countries have witnessed rapidly rising literacy
rates and education enrollment . . . Moreover, the rise in university placement in the two
countries has been absolutely phenomenal.”). See e.g., Anil K. Gupta & Haiyan Wang, China
as Innovator, Not Just an Imitator, BUS. WEEK (Mar. 9, 2009, 7:41 AM), http://www.business-
week.com/stories/2009-03-09/china-as-an-innovator-not-just-an-imitatorbusinessweek-busi-
ness-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (“Many of the scientific leaders who are
overseeing the utilization of [government R&D] funds are highly qualified Western-educated
researchers returning to China in growing numbers.”).
47. Gupta & Wang, supra note 46 (“The social and economic challenges that are either
unique or particularly acute in China are likely to serve as the demand-side derivers of innova-
tion.”).  As an example Gupta & Wang offer BYD, a Chinese based company that became the
world’s first company to start selling a plug-in electric hybrid car. Id.
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II. DATA AND METHODS
To evaluate our hypotheses that foreign investment, government policy,
or shifts in the types of technologies might be the driving factors behind
Chinese patent growth, we examined the USPTO data on these patents. Spe-
cifically, we evaluated the number of patent applications originating from
China, allowance rates for those applications, and the mix of technologies
covered by these patent applications.  We also compared Chinese patenting
activity with the patenting activity of inventors in other countries.  Because
examination standards differ across patent offices, comparing domestic fil-
ings in China with domestic filings in other countries may lead to spurious
findings.  By focusing on USPTO filings, we are able to control for exami-
nation standards.
The number of applications received may help decipher whether China’s
current patenting trends are unique or are following the development pattern
observed in other Far East Asian countries in the past.  Comparing patent
applications from China to those from other countries shows how China’s
patent activity is different from that of other emerging and established econ-
omies.  This may also be helpful in understanding whether the influx of
R&D in China has been effective and efficient, and whether it may be used
to project future patenting behavior.
Allowance rates and the change in allowance rates are helpful in deter-
mining whether the increase in applications is merely the result of a push for
more applications or whether the development of patentable technology in
China is increasing in real terms.  Allowance rate data may also be helpful in
establishing the impact of MNCs and U.S. and Chinese policies on the qual-
ity of patent applications.
The technology mix of applications may back up the assertion that the
Chinese innovation market is becoming more advanced, which would in turn
explain the increase in patent applications.  Examination of the concentration
in the technology mix among patent applications may have implications for
whether China’s patent trends are sustainable or just the result of a single-
industry boom.
To understand whether China is exhibiting unique trends or following
historical patterns, we first compare Chinese patent trends between 2000 and
2012 with those trends from the other BRICS countries and with Japan and
South Korea during the same period.  We then make a historical comparison
using South Korea and India as benchmarks.  In our analysis, we compare
China’s highest ten-year growth in patent applications period, 1997-2007,
with similar high-growth rate periods experienced by the comparison
groups, such as South Korea, India and the BRICS countries.  We chose the
South Korean comparison group because the growth in the number of South
Korea applications between 1986 and 1996 was similar to the growth in
Chinese applications from 1997 to 2007.  We chose the Indian comparison
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group because the growth in applications from that country has greatly ex-
ceeded the growth in applications from the other major emerging economies
outside of China.  These two sets of data (comparing China, BRICS, and
Japan/South Korea between 2000 and 2012 and comparing China, South Ko-
rea, and India during their respective high-growth periods) are examined for
each observed trend.  Moreover, virtually all the patent applications in our
dataset from pre-2007 have proceeded to a final disposition.
A. Measuring the Increase in Patent Applications
The data used to calculate patent application statistics in this study are
from the USPTO’s internal Patent Application Location and Monitoring
(“PALM”) system.  Patent examiners at the USPTO use the PALM system
to monitor the progress of prosecution of each patent application.  The
PALM data include the following information:  (1) the date that each appli-
cation was received by the USPTO; (2) the identities of the inventors; (3) the
addresses of the inventors; (4) the art unit to which the application is as-
signed; and (5) the ultimate disposal state (allowed, abandoned, or pending)
of the application.  All patent applications received by the USPTO, including
those that have never been published, are present in PALM.48  The analyses
that follow consider only regular utility patent applications, not design patent
applications or provisional patent applications.
We define an application’s country of origin as the country of residence
of the application’s first-named inventor.  The Chinese applications included
in the study do not include applications where the first-named inventor was
from Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan.  The applications can, however, in-
clude cases where a foreign national, who is living in China, is the first-
named inventor.  Chinese applications also include many cases in which
Chinese nationals, living in China but working for multinational enterprises,
are first-named inventors.49  A similar approach is used to determine which
applications originated from each of the comparison countries.
B. Measuring Patent Allowance Rates
Our calculated allowance rates come from the set of all applications that
had either been abandoned or allowed as of August 2013.  The allowance
48. In this way, PALM differs from the public version of the Patent Application Infor-
mation Retrieval (PAIR) system.  Public PAIR only includes applications that have been made
public due to the issuing of a patent, the publication of the application, or for other reasons.
The PALM data can only be accessed by PTO personnel who can show reason for needing to
access it. See USPTO, APPLICATION RECORDS AND REPORTS (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/s1704.html.
49. Analysis of patent assignment data reveals that a significant portion of U.S. patents
applied for by inventors from China and India are owned by multinational corporations. Based
on our analysis of the PALM data, we find that more than half of the U.S. applications from
Chinese first-named inventors include co-inventors. Roughly, 20 percent of these include co-
inventors that do not reside in China (data on file with author).
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rates are reported for the year of application rather than the year of disposal.
As an example, consider a case where the USPTO received 10,000 applica-
tions from inventors in a given country in 2006.  Suppose that by August
2013, 4,500 of the applications had been issued as a patent, 4,500 had been
abandoned, and 1,000 were still pending.  The allowance rate for 2006
would be 50 percent (i.e., 4,500 total issued patents divided by 9,000 total
disposals).
We also address two issues regarding the allowance rate results.  First,
the allowance rates we calculate are only for applications that have been
disposed, even though many of the applications filed in the later years are
still pending.  It is unclear what the final allowance rate will be for applica-
tions filed in these years.  However, for applications filed in the earliest
years (2000 through 2002), we found no evidence that the final allowance
rate differed from the allowance rates for the first 20 percent of applications
disposed from each of those years.  In essence, the allowance rate for dis-
posed applications when only 20 or 30 percent of the applications have been
disposed appears to be a good estimate of what the final allowance rate will
be after all applications have been disposed.  Thus, we are confident that the
convergence of allowance rates in the later years is not due to biased mea-
sures of the final allowance rates.
Second, the allowance rates we calculate from different countries may
vary based primarily on the different technology mixes of the applications
from those countries.  Some technology areas, such as biotechnology, ex-
hibit lower allowance rates.  Thus, overall allowance rates may change sim-
ply due to changes in the technology mix.  We used multivariate statistical
models to control for the differences in the technology mix,50 and the result
regarding the convergence of the Chinese allowance rate to the Japanese/
South Korean allowance rate did not change.  After controlling for technol-
ogy mix, we found that the allowance rate for the other major emerging
economies also converges toward that of Japan and South Korea.  However,
the rate of convergence is still greater for the Chinese patent applications.
C. Measuring the Technology Mix
To examine the technology mix of incoming applications, we consider
the technology centers (“TCs”) at the USPTO to which they are assigned.
We group the technology centers into the following six technology catego-
ries based on the USPTO’s technology center categories:
50. We used a logistic regression model and included dummies for country and technol-
ogy, along with their interactions. We performed a logistic regression on all patent applications
from China and the comparison groups to adjust the allowance rates. The regression included
the indicators for technology area, year of application, China applications, BRIC applications,
interactions between China and year of application, and the BRIC country and year of applica-
tion. We then used the odds ratios from this logit model to adjust the Chinese and BRIC
allowance rates vis-a`-vis the Japan/Korea allowance rates.
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• Biotechnology and organic chemistry (BIO) – TC 160051
• Chemical and materials engineering (CHEM) – TC 170052
• Computers and communications (COMP)53 – TCs 2100, 2400, and
260054
• Semiconductors, electrical and optical systems and components
(SEMI) – TC 280055
• Transportation, construction, electronic commerce, agriculture, na-
tional security and license & review (TRANS) – TC 360056
• Mechanical engineering, manufacturing, products (MECH) – TC
370057
While examining the changes in the technology mix, we also consider
changes in the relative concentration of the technology mix over time for
each country (or group of countries) of interest.  To do so, we used the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”), a measure commonly used by econo-
mists when examining market concentration.  To calculate the index, we first
calculate the share of all applications in each of the six technology areas.
We then square each of these shares and sum them up.  Higher values of the
index indicate higher levels of concentration.  Given that we have six tech-
nology areas, the smallest value the index can take on is 0.167, which would
indicate a uniform distribution of applications across the six technology ar-
51. In prior years, TCs 1200 and 1800 (no longer in use) mapped to the BIO area. John
L. King, Patent Examination Procedures and Patent Quality, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY 54, 58 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
52. In prior years, TCs 1100, 1300, and 1500 (all no longer in use) mapped to the
CHEM area. Id.
53. In the areas of computers and telecommunications, the TCs have not been stable
since 2000. Currently these types of patent applications are assigned to one of the following
three TCs:
• 2100 – Computer Architecture, Software, and Information Security
• 2400 – Computer Networks, Multiplex Communication, Video Distribution and
Security
• 2600 – Communications
TC 2400 is relatively new; applications that would commonly be assigned to that TC would
have been assigned to either 2100 or 2600 earlier in the decade. Thus, we decided to combine
these three TCs into one category called “computers and communications.” USPTO, OFFICE
OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR PATENT OPERATIONS, http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/or-
ganizational-offices/office-commissioner-patents/office-deputy-commissioner-patent.
54. In prior years, TCs 2300 and 2700 (both no longer in use) mapped to the COMP
area. King, supra note 51, at 58; see also USPTO, CONSUMER SATISFACTION SURVEY FOR
APPLICANTS, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/oqm-old/asci_survey.pdf.
55. In prior years TCs 2200 and 2500 (both no longer in use) mapped to the SEMI area.
Prior to 1998, TC 2100 mapped to the SEMI area instead of the COMP area. King, supra note
51, at 58.
56. In prior years TCs 3100 and 3500 (both no longer in use) mapped to the TRANS
area. Id.
57. In prior years TCs 3200, 3300, and 3400 (all no longer in use) mapped to the
MECH area. Id.
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eas.  The largest value that the index can take on is 1, which would indicate
that all of the applications were assigned to just one of the six technology
areas.
D. Calculating Geographic Concentration and Foreign Co-invention
We used the location information from the PALM database to analyze
the degree of geographic concentration for patent applications filed in the
U.S. from China.  We identify several regions in China that are particularly
productive in patent applications.  Again, we employ the HHI, explained
above, in calculating the relative geographic concentration of patent applica-
tions for different regions in China.
We also determined the percentage of U.S. patent applications from
China that had at least one foreign co-inventor but with first-named Chinese
inventors for the period from 2000 to 2011.  We then obtained similar for-
eign co-invention data for U.S. patent applications originating from Japan;
South Korea; United States; the European Union including Switzerland;
“Other China,” which includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao; and “Other
East Asia,” which includes the ASEAN countries and Mongolia.
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results of our study are organized by the four patent trend measures
that we focused on: patent applications, allowance rates, concentration in
technology mix, and geographic concentration.  For each trend, the results
from the first data set (focusing on the current time period and on applica-
tions from China, the BRICS countries, and Japan or South Korea) are dis-
cussed first, and the results from the second set (focusing on the respective
ten-year high-growth periods for China, South Korea, and India) are dis-
cussed second.
A. The Divergence of China’s Innovation Economy
from Other BRICS Nations
Since 2000, China has distinguished itself from other BRICS nations in
its approach to patenting.  Our results show that China has seen an increase
in patent applications in addition to higher allowance rates.  China has also
emphasized rapidly developing technological areas like computing and
semiconductors where new products often require a large number of
innovations.
1. Patent Applications to the USPTO:  2000-Present
The increase in USPTO patent applications from Mainland China since
2000 has outpaced applications from the other BRICS economies, as shown
in Figure 1.  The USPTO received 422 patent applications from Mainland
China in 2000, as compared to 1,200 applications from the other four BRICS
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countries.58  By 2006, the USPTO was annually receiving 40 percent more
applications from China than from the other four emerging economies com-
bined.  In 2012, the number of applications from China was more than 90
percent higher than the number of applications from the other emerging
economies.  This is in part due to the tax incentives given to American com-
panies in China, leading to an intensification of R&D in China and prompt-
ing Chinese firms to file for more patent applications at home and abroad.59
FIGURE 1. GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF UTILITY PATENT APPLICATIONS TO
THE USPTO FROM CHINA AND OTHER BRICS ECONOMIES, 2000-2012
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Even with the growth in Chinese patent applications, the number of ap-
plications from China was still quite small over this period when compared
to the number of applications coming from Japan and South Korea.60  Japa-
nese and South Korean inventors accounted for roughly 50,000 applications
in the year 2000, with applications from these two countries peaking at a
little over 80,000 in 2007.  The number of applications from Japan and
South Korea fell slightly following the financial crisis in 2008, but re-
bounded to 79,000 by 2012.  This growth in the number of applications since
58. If current trends continue, the number of Chinese patents granted by the PTO will
exceed the number of patents from Germany, Britain, Italy, and France combined by the year
2020. Gupta & Wang, supra note 46.
59. See Hu & Jefferson, supra note 29, at 64.
60. This explains why the numbers for U.S. patent applications from Japan and Korea
are not included in Figure 1.
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2000 is comparable to the growth in the number of patent applications from
U.S.-based inventors during the same period – increasing at an average an-
nual growth rate of 3.7 percent.  Within the same period, however, growth in
patent applications from U.S.-based inventors was much lower than growth
in the number of foreign applications to the USPTO, which roughly doubled
over the same twelve-year period reflecting an average annual growth rate of
6 percent.
While the absolute numbers of patent applications from China were not
as high as those from other East Asian countries, the growth rate of Chinese
patent applications far exceeded that of other foreign applications.  In Figure
2, we compare China’s rate of growth in patent applications with those of
the two comparison groups (Japan/South Korea, and the other BRICS).  The
number of applications from the other BRICS grew at an average annual rate
of roughly 11 percent, so that by 2012, the USPTO received more than three
times as many applications from these countries than it had received from
them in 2000.  Thus, the number of applications from these countries grew at
a rate far greater than that of all foreign applications.  Over this same period,
however, the number of applications from Mainland China grew at an aver-
age annual rate of 31 percent.  This means that by 2012, the USPTO was
receiving 25 times as many applications from Chinese inventors as it had
received in 2000.61
FIGURE 2. COMPARING THE RATE OF GROWTH OF USPTO UTILITY PATENT
APPLICATIONS FROM CHINA TO THE COMPARISON GROUPS, 2000-2012
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61. Interestingly, this growth rate is very similar to the rate of growth in patent applica-
tions to SIPO from Chinese residents. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 1.
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2. Allowance Rates for Applications to the USPTO:  2000-Present
The enormous increase in the number of patent applications from China
did not decrease the quality of the patent application as measured by patent
allowance rates.  Figure 3 illustrates how the allowance rates have changed
for Chinese applications as well as for the two comparison groups: Japan/
South Korea, and the other BRICS economies.  Among the three groups dis-
cussed here, allowance rates have been highest for applications from Japan
and South Korea.  For applications received from these two countries in
2000, the allowance rate was slightly over 80 percent (as compared to
roughly 66 percent for applications from China and the other major emerg-
ing economies).  Allowance rates generally fell, regardless of origin, through
2007, but have been increasing since that time.  As shown in Figure 3, the
allowance rate for Chinese applications in the USPTO has been steadily con-
verging with the allowance rate for Japanese and South Korean applications.
At the same time, it has been diverging from the relatively lower allowance
rates of the other BRICS countries where China found itself in the earlier
years shown in Figure 3.  This improvement in allowance rate may indicate
that Chinese applicants are adapting to the system in use by the USPTO.
The allowance rate also may have been improved by increased international
cooperation with inventors who were already familiar with USPTO practices
and regulations.
FIGURE 3. COMPARING ALLOWANCE RATES OF DISPOSED APPLICATIONS,
2000-2010
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3. Evolution of the Technology Mix for Applications to the USPTO:
2000-Present
The growth rate of the number of applications from China has not been
uniform across technology areas, as illustrated in Figure 4.  The highest rates
of growth have come in computers and communications (COMP) and in
electrical engineering and optics (SEMI).  In each of these areas, the num-
bers of applications have grown at average annual rates of 37 percent and 33
percent, respectively.  The biotechnology area has experienced the lowest
growth at an average annual rate of 19 percent.
FIGURE 4. THE GROWTH OF USPTO UTILITY PATENT APPLICATIONS FROM
CHINA BY TECHNOLOGY AREA, 2000-2012
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Comparing the technology mix of 2000 to 2002 with that of 2010 to
2012, we note that Chinese patent applications have shifted from the bio-
technology, chemical and mechanical areas to computer and semiconductor.
Panel (a) in Figure 5 illustrates this change in the technology mix of Chinese
patent applications.  Given the results presented in Figure 4, it is not surpris-
ing to see a shift away from the technology areas that have been growing
least quickly (BIO, CHEM, and MECH) to the two fastest growing technol-
ogy areas (COMP and SEMI).  The change in the share of all applications
assigned to COMP has grown much larger, from 24 percent at the beginning
of the period to 40 percent at the end of the period.  Panels (b) through (d) in
Figure 5 show the changes in the technology mixes for three different com-
parison groups.  Panel (b) shows the changes for the other BRICS econo-
mies; Panel (c) shows the changes for Japan and South Korea; and Panel (d)
shows the changes for all applications to the USPTO for the same period.
Fall 2015] Chinese Exceptionalism in Patenting Behavior 73
FIGURE 5. CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY MIX, APPLICATIONS TO THE USPTO
FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES, 2000-02 TO 2010-12
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Similar to the Chinese patent application technology mix, the technol-
ogy mix for the other BRICS economies has skewed more toward COMP
and away from the BIO, CHEM, and MECH areas.  The share of all applica-
tions from these countries assigned to COMP has more than doubled over
the past decade.
The share of applications from Japan and South Korea assigned to
COMP has grown, but less so than for either China or the other BRICS
countries (see Figure 5 and Figure A1 in Appendix).  From 2000 to 2002, 24
percent of the applications from Japan and South Korea were in COMP.  By
the later time-period—2010 to 2012—the share of COMP applications had
grown to 29 percent, though SEMI continued to receive the greatest share of
applications, with a 34 percent share at the beginning of the period and a 35
percent share at the end of the period.  The growth in the shares of the
COMP and SEMI areas was offset by small decreases in the shares of the
other technology areas.
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The relative stability of the technology mix for Japan and South Korea
is likely a result of a greater level of maturity in those countries’ economies.
As a final comparison, Panel (d) of Figure 5 presents the change in the tech-
nology mix of all patent applications received by the USPTO.  Again, the
shares of applications in COMP and SEMI are seeing small increases, but
the result is not nearly as pronounced as the results are for China and the
other major emerging economies.  The rush to attempt patenting innovations
in the COMP area by inventors in these emerging economies, including
China, does not appear to be a broader trend encompassing other technology
areas.  For China and the other BRICS economies, there has been a much
greater shift into the COMP and SEMI technology areas and away from the
other technology areas.62
The technology mix of Chinese applications has not only changed sig-
nificantly over the past decade, but that it has become more concentrated
(see Figure 6).  In 2000, China’s technology mix was not concentrated in
any one or two areas, with an HHI of 0.18.  The same could be said for the
technology mix for the other BRICS, with an HHI of 0.17.  By 2006, how-
ever, the technology mix of Chinese applications had become much more
concentrated (skewed toward the COMP and SEMI areas), and the HHI had
increased to 0.27 by 2006.  The technology mix of Chinese applications has
subsequently flattened and maintained a comparable level of concentration
from 2006 to 2012.  The involvement of multinational corporations in the
electrical and electronics/computer industry helps explain why the SEMI
area has become so concentrated. Since 2006, a sudden increase in new
Class 361 (the USPTO’s designation for electrical system and device pat-
ents) patents from China can be traced to R&D that is heavily focused on
China’s electrical and electronics industry.63  For example, Foxconn Tech-
nology Co. is responsible for 90 percent of China’s newly issued American
patents in the USPC 361 sector.64  Foxconn is a Taiwanese multinational
company with major American clients, including Amazon, Apple,
Microsoft, and Dell.65  Foxconn is also planning on expanding its American
manufacturing power with new factories in the U.S.66  It is unsurprising that
a multinational corporation with significant American involvement would be
adept at prosecuting patent applications at the USPTO.
62. See Appendix, Figure A1.
63. Jia Zheng et al., Industry Evolution and Key Technologies in China Based on Patent
Analysis, 87 SCIENTOMETRICS 175, 183 (2010).
64. Id. at 182.
65. Charlie Osborne, Foxconn in Talks to Boost Manufacturing in United States,
ZDNET (Jan. 24, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/foxconn-in-talks-to-boost-manufac-
turing-in-united-states-7000025724/.
66. Id.
Fall 2015] Chinese Exceptionalism in Patenting Behavior 75
FIGURE 6. TECHNOLOGY MIX CONCENTRATIONS OF APPLICATIONS FROM
CHINA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA, AND OTHER BRICS ECONOMIES,
2000-2012
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The technology concentration of applications from the other BRICS has
also increased, although this increase was not pronounced until 2012 (see
Figure 6).  The HHI for these countries had increased from 0.17 in 2000 to
0.25 by 2008.  The HHI for these emerging economies stayed between 0.23
to 0.25 before increasing sharply to 0.28 in 2012.  The technology mix con-
centration of Japanese and South Korean applications was high relative to
those of the other comparison groups for the first part of that period, but has
also remained fairly consistent, rising only slightly from 0.235 to 0.25 over
that period.  Since 2006, the technology concentration for Japan and South
Korea has been lower than China’s and similar to that of the other BRICS
countries.
B. China’s Development Boom Mirrors Other East Asian Countries
Our empirical results demonstrate that as China’s patenting trends di-
verged from those of the BRICS nations and other emerging economies,
they became more similar to patenting trends observed in South Korea and
India during their high-growth periods.  The shift in technology mix that
accompanied each country’s technology boom provides additional insights
(e.g., the technology sectors that drove the boom) into the big picture of
innovation and patent protection.
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1. Patent Applications to the USPTO:  High-Growth Periods
In India, South Korea, and China, the number of applications in the base
year is quite small at the beginning of the high-growth period.  This number
ranged from 131 applications from China in 1996 to 158 applications from
South Korea in 1986 to 164 applications from India in 1998.  Figure 7 illus-
trates how quickly the number of applications from each of these countries
grew over the following ten years.  The growth in Chinese applications from
1996 to 2006 was remarkably similar to the growth in South Korean applica-
tions over the previous decade (1986 to 1996), especially through the first
eight years (through 2005 in the case of China).  In each case, the number of
applications at the end of the period was roughly 30 times higher, which
reflected a roughly 40 percent average annual growth rate over ten years.
Even India, with its 30 percent average annual growth rate in applications
from 1998 to 2008, is left lagging.67  This comparison shows that the recent
explosive growth in applications from China has at least one precedent.68
FIGURE 7. GROWTH IN UTILITY PATENT APPLICATIONS TO THE USPTO FROM
CHINA (1997-2007), SOUTH KOREA (1986-1996), AND INDIA (1998-2008)
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PALM data collected by the USPTO 
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67. Why else might India be left lagging?  One critic argues that the geography of inno-
vation in China and India is different.  In China, agglomeration forces, linked to population,
industrial specializations, and infrastructure endowment, drive innovation.  In India, innova-
tion is more dependent on a combination of good local socioeconomic structures and invest-
ment in science and technology. See generally Crescenzi et al., supra note 46.
68. China has also been, and is predicted to continue to be, successful in securing pat-
ents. If trends continue, by 2020, the number of China-originated granted patents will exceed
the number of granted patents from Germany, Britain, France and Italy combined.  Gupta &
Wang, supra note 46.
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2. Allowance Rates for Applications to the USPTO:
High-Growth Periods
When adjusted by technology area,69 the allowance rate for South Ko-
rean applications generally increased while the allowance rates for Chinese
and Indian applications generally decreased over the periods of interest (see
Figure 8).  It appears, however, that these trends were driven by general
trends in the overall allowance rate for all patent applications in the USPTO.
If anything, the evolution of South Korean and Chinese allowance rates fol-
lowed the evolution of the allowance rates for all applications to the USPTO.
The decrease in the allowance rate for Indian applications was more dra-
matic than the underlying decrease in the allowance rate for all applications
to the USPTO.  Additionally, the technology area-adjusted allowance rate
for South Korean applications from 1988 through 1996 was generally on par
with the overall allowance rate at the USPTO, while the allowance rate for
Chinese applications from 1997 through 2007 was generally lower than the
overall allowance rate, with a recent reduction in the gap by 2012 (see Fig-
ure 8).  The allowance rate for Indian applications went from being much
higher than average from 1998 to 2002 to being average by 2005.
FIGURE 8. COMPARING THE TECHNOLOGY-ADJUSTED ALLOWANCE RATES FOR
SOUTH KOREA (1986-1996), CHINA (1997-2007), AND INDIA (1998-2008)
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PALM data from the USPTO. 
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69. See supra Section III.B.
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3. Evolution of the Technology Mix for Applications to the USPTO:
High-Growth Periods
For each high-growth period case, we analyze the evolution of the tech-
nology mix for applications received from the country over the ten-year pe-
riod.  Figure 9 illustrates how the technology mix changed for Chinese
applications.  At the beginning of the period (1997 to 1999), the CHEM and
SEMI technology areas were most important, accounting for 25 percent and
22 percent of all applications, respectively (see Figure 9).  By the end of the
period, the CHEM area accounted for only 9 percent of all applications,
while the COMP area had grown from a 10 percent share to a 35 percent
share.  The BIO area had also become a smaller share of applications, falling
from 15 percent to 7 percent over the same period.
FIGURE 9. CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY MIX, CHINESE APPLICATIONS TO THE
USPTO, 1996-2006
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
BIO CHEM COMP SEMI TRANS MECH
Pe
rc
en
t o
f a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
Technology area 
1997-99 2001-03 2005-07
By comparison, applications from India in the late 1990s were heavily
concentrated in the BIO area (see Figure A2 in Appendix).  Roughly 45
percent of the applications were in that area.  By the end of that period, the
Indian applications were still heavily concentrated in one area, but that area
had switched from BIO to COMP.  For the 2006 to 2008 period, the COMP
technology area accounted for roughly half of all applications.  During South
Korea’s ten-year high-growth period, the share of all applications in the
SEMI area grew from 20 percent to 35 percent (see Figure A3 in Appendix).
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During this same period, the shares of applications in the TRANS and
MECH areas each fell by at least 30 percent.
In each high-growth case, the technology mix concentration rose stead-
ily after an initial drop. This can be seen in figure 10, which compares the
technology mix of China, South Korea, and India to the overall technology
mix at the USPTO at the time.70  For China, the HHI initially fell from 0.2 to
0.175 between 1997 and 1999, but then rose to 0.275 by 2006.  For South
Korea, the HHI initially fell from 0.24 to 0.19 between 1986 and 1988, but
then rose to 0.25 by 1992 and fluctuated between 0.22 and 0.25 through
1996.  The technology mix concentration was generally much higher for In-
dia.  The HHI initially fell from 0.33 in 1998 to 0.26 in 2003, only to rise
again to 0.34 by 2008.  It is also worth noting that the technology mix of
applications from China was generally the least concentrated of the technol-
ogy mixes during the country’s periods of fast growth, except toward the end
of the ten-year period where China’s technology mix concentration for 2006
and 2007 was slightly higher than the concentration for South Korea for
1995 and 1996.
FIGURE 10. CHANGE OF THE CONCENTRATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY MIX
FOR APPLICATIONS FROM THE THREE COUNTRIES AND FOR ALL
APPLICATIONS (HHI MEASURE)
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70. We again use the HHI to measure the technology mix concentration. Supra Section
III.
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C. Geographic Concentration in China
As the technology mix of Chinese applications to USPTO has become
more concentrated, so has the geographic mix of patent applications from
regions in China.  Figure 11 illustrates how the mix of applications evolved
between 2000 and 2012.  The results focus on the following regions in
China: Guangdong province, Beijing municipality, Shanghai municipality,
Jiangsu province, Zhejiang province, and other regions.  At the beginning of
the millennium, more applications came from Beijing municipality (28 per-
cent) than from any other region.  At that same time, slightly less than 20
percent of the applications came from the Guangdong province.  However,
the growth in the rate of patenting by inventors in Guangdong province
greatly outpaced overall growth in China for the next several years so that by
2006 applications from Guangdong accounted for nearly 50 percent of all
applications from China to the USPTO.  Guangdong’s share has consistently
remained at over 40 percent since then.  Over the most recent period, the
three dominant regions have been Guangdong province (45 percent) and the
Beijing (21 percent) and Shanghai (14 percent) municipalities.  These three
regions currently account for 80 percent of all applications from China.
FIGURE 11. THE GEOGRAPHIC MIX OF APPLICATIONS FROM CHINA, 2000-12
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As a measure of the concentration of the geographic mix in China, HHIs
were calculated for each year from 2000 onward (see Figure A4 in Appen-
dix).  The results show that applications to the USPTO from China have
become more geographically concentrated since the turn of the millennium.
The most recent trends (from 2009 to 2012) seem to indicate that geographic
Fall 2015] Chinese Exceptionalism in Patenting Behavior 81
mix may be becoming less concentrated, although a similar trend between
2006 and 2008 quickly reversed itself.
According to one critic, the concentration of innovation in China is
“fundamentally driven by agglomeration forces, linked to population, indus-
trial specialization, and infrastructure endowment.”71  In “mature” innova-
tion systems like the United States, patenting activity is spread among a
greater number of regions than in emerging systems like China, where pat-
enting is concentrated in Guangdong, Beijing, and Shanghai. However, it
should be noted that geographic patent concentration in China is not much
different from in the U.S., where the Silicon Valley region is responsible for
25 percent of issued U.S. patents.72
This polarization in China is enforced by an emerging trend among Chi-
nese local authorities.  These local authorities engage in territorial competi-
tion to attract external resources from both international investors and the
Chinese central government. Authorities from these regions have more
wealth and political power, and they promote the concentration of innovat-
ing activities at the expense of neighboring territories.  Further, the enact-
ment of Special Economic Zones in 1978 increased territorial concentration
in Chinese innovation.  This spatially concentrated FDI flows into a limited
number of geographic zones and thus developed clusters of innovative activ-
ity in these regions.
These concentrations suggest that researchers looking for patterns and
trends should focus on innovation within specific regions rather than exam-
ining it throughout the nation as a whole.73  Other researchers have found
that India displays similar geographic concentrations,74 and future studies
applying this approach could compare the booming technology centers of
China with those of the comparison groups, such as similar technology pro-
ducing clusters in India or South Korea, or even cities like San Francisco
and New York.
D. Foreign Co-Inventors in U.S. Patent Applications from China
The influence of foreign companies doing business in China receives
much attention.  Many of these foreign companies are initially drawn to
China for its attractive manufacturing environment and large domestic mar-
ket, but they often expand their activities to include research and develop-
ment projects and operations.  To analyze the effects of these companies and
their investments on Chinese development, first we examined  U.S. patent
applications from China that contain at least one foreign co-inventor.  Sec-
71. Crescenzi et al., supra note 46, at 1055.
72. DRUID, supra note 26, at 01:07:25-01:08:01.
73. Indeed, Daniele Archibugi argues that countries may no longer be the relevant polit-
ical unit in this area of study.  DRUID, supra note 26, at 55:00-57:55.
74. Crescenzi et al., supra note 46, at 1057.
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ond, we investigated the country or region of origin of the foreign co-inven-
tor.  Third, we compare the rates of having foreign co-inventors on patents
originating China with the same rates from South Korea’s high-growth pe-
riod in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Figure 12 shows the percentage of U.S. patent applications from China
with at least one non-Chinese co-inventor by year of application for the
years 2000 through 2011, which we use as a proxy for the level of foreign
involvement in Chinese R&D.  We have chosen to examine this scenario
understanding that there may be many more patent applications involving all
Chinese inventors working for multi-national companies in China.  Hence,
these figures represent a lower bound for joint research and development
activities conducted by MNCs in China. For over a decade more than 10%
of these Chinese patent applications contain a foreign co-inventor, and Fig-
ure 12 shows that this figure hovered around 18 percent in 2007 and 2008.
FIGURE 12. PERCENTAGE OF U.S. PATENT APPLICATIOS FROM CHINA WITH
AT LEAST ONE NON-CHINESE CO-INVENTOR, BY YEAR OF APPLICATION,
2000-2011
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We also analyze the country or region of the foreign co-inventor in Chi-
nese patent applications in the U.S (see Figure 13).  The major countries of
origin for foreign co-inventors on Chinese patent applications are the United
States, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao.  The European Union, Japan, South
Korea, and other East Asian countries figure much less prominently (each
less than 2 percent) as countries of origin for co-inventors.  The results in
Figure 13 clearly indicate that joint R&D activities that result in joint patent-
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ing involve Chinese collaborations with the United States and with its near-
est neighbors, namely Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao.
FIGURE 13. PERCENTAGE OF U.S. PATENT APPLICATIONS FROM CHINA
WITH AT LEAST ONE FOREIGN CO-INVENTOR FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES/
REGIONS, BY YEAR OF APPLICATION, 2000-2011
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We note that China and South Korea differ significantly when compar-
ing the percentage of U.S. patent applications with foreign co-inventors from
China with those coming from South Korea during its boom in Figure 14.
Between 1986 and 2006—a period of high growth for South Korea—less
than 2 percent of all U.S. patent applications originating from South Korea
contained one or more foreign co-inventors.  In contrast, for the correspond-
ing high-growth period in China from 1996 to 2006 the percentage of U.S.
patent applications from China with foreign co-inventors is much higher.
During the entire decade this rate was always more than 10 percent, and it
was typically between 12 and 14 percent.  This indicates that MNCs cur-
rently have a greater interest in pursuing joint R&D activities in China than
they did during South Korea’s boom.  It is also possible that with increasing
globalization, MNCs are simply more willing to locate R&D activities in
foreign locales in the 2000s than they were in the 1980s.
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FIGURE 14. PERCENTAGE OF U.S. PATENT APPLICATIONS WITH AT LEAST
ONE FOREIGN CO-INVENTOR DURING THE HIGH-GROWTH PERIODS FOR
SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA
 
Note:  The white bars indicate the results for South Korea for 1997-2006. 
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Even with globalization, the percentage of foreign co-inventors in U.S.
patent applications from South Korea has remained under 2 percent for over
two decades—during the entire period of 1986 to 2006. This figure is in
sharp contrast with China, where the percentage of foreign co-inventors in
the period between 1996 to 2006 has ranged between 10 to 15 percent, as
shown in Figure 14.  For the same high-growth periods, the percentage of
foreign co-inventors in U.S. patent applications from South Korea compared
to that from China is significantly different (See Figure 14).  Our data and
analysis support the view that, at least in part, the steadily increasing U.S.
patent filings originating from China are spurred by MNCs engaging in joint
R&D activities in China.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Our results show that China’s patenting trends at the USPTO have much
in common with other East Asian technology booms.  These commonalities
are particularly striking when looking at the growth of South Korea in the
1980s.  We are also able to observe the role of foreign direct investment,
shifts in the technological focus, and geographic concentration.  Our analysis
provides helpful insights into possible future developments.
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A. Parallels Between China and South Korea
It appears from our analysis that China is not exhibiting exceptional
trends in technology innovation and in seeking patent protection. Instead, it
is developing in a manner similar to other innovative countries in Far East
Asia, primarily South Korea.  In fact, the application trends from South Ko-
rea in the 1980s and the evolution of patenting characteristics in China are
strikingly similar when application growth rates, patent allowance rates, and
the technology mix of applications are considered.
The astronomical growth in the number of patent applications to SIPO
from Chinese firms has been accompanied by similar growth in the number
of applications to the USPTO from Chinese inventors.  The number of appli-
cations to the USPTO from China grew at an average annual growth rate of
31 percent from 422 in 2000 to 10,511 in 2012.  But the number of applica-
tions to the USPTO was already growing steadily before the turn of the
century.  Between 1997 and 2007, the average rate of growth was roughly 40
percent.  As noted above, the increase in patent filings at the USPTO from
Chinese inventors was likely influenced by several factors, including higher
R&D investment, the Chinese government’s aggressive patent reform ef-
forts, and Chinese patent applicants’ increasing familiarity with USPTO
practices and regulations.
The rapid growth of Chinese inventors in U.S. patent filings is not un-
precedented.  The number of applications from South Korean inventors also
increased at a yearly rate of roughly 40 percent from 1986 through 1996.  In
fact, using the South Korean experience as a guide, we should expect the
number of Chinese applications to continue to grow steadily for at least the
next decade (see Figure A5 in Appendix).
While the number of applications from China has increased over the
past decade, so has the level of relative concentration of these applications in
high tech areas such as computing, telecommunications, and electrical engi-
neering.  At the same time, the share of applications in biotechnology and
chemical and material engineering fell from roughly 28 to 14 percent.  Our
historical analyses indicate that this trend had been ongoing since the mid-
1990s.  We found a similar result for other major emerging economies.  In
several of these economies, the share of computing and telecommunications
applications grew substantially while the share of biotech and chemical engi-
neering applications fell.  The technology mix was more stable for Japan and
South Korea, indicating that we may expect a more stable technology mix
for Chinese applications as the Chinese economy matures.
Finally, the allowance rate for Chinese applications has steadily climbed
in the past decade towards the allowance rates of South Korean and Japanese
applications.  For applications filed in the year 2000, we find that the allow-
ance rate for South Korean and Japanese inventors exceeded the allowance
rate for Chinese inventors by 10 percentage points (82 percent versus 72
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percent).  For applications filed in the year 2010 and disposed by February
2013, the difference between the two allowance rates was only one percent-
age point (79 percent versus 78 percent).
B. Explaining Improvements in Allowance Rate
An increased familiarity with USPTO procedures, and growth in capital
investment and R&D expenditures have likely played large roles in improv-
ing patent application quality as measured by allowance rates.  As SIPO’s
patent procedures have begun to mirror USPTO patent procedures, learning
the new Chinese system provides a double benefit to Chinese inventors.
Chinese applicants who follow these procedures have a better chance of hav-
ing a patent application approved by SIPO, and they do not need to learn
entirely new rules to submit successful applications to the USPTO.  Interna-
tional collaboration has likely also contributed to increased success before
the USPTO, as Chinese inventors often now work more closely with mul-
tinational enterprises and innovators who have years of experience applying
for patents at the USPTO.  In short, applicants who submit patent applica-
tions more successfully likely do so because of increased experience dealing
with the USPTO or entities that follow similar procedures.
In addition to procedural factors, our analysis also highlights the role
played by MNCs, who file a majority of the U.S. patent applications
originating from China, and supports the work of other scholars who have
emphasized the role played by outside entities in China.75  As MNCs move
beyond low cost manufacturing in China and start creating R&D centers in
China to capitalize on highly educated, local Chinese talent, the production
of innovative technologies in China will likely increase.  To the extent that
this is already occurring, it can partially explain the increase in patent quality
suggested by our results.
The increase of high quality patent applications from Chinese applicants
may also be a result of China’s shift from discrete product industries to com-
plex product industries.  Our findings (see, for example, Figure A6) support
this interpretation by highlighting the high rates of ATP exports from China
compared to the rates of ATP exports from other emerging economies.  This
suggests that increased patenting activity in China is partly a result of Chi-
nese businesses focusing on more complex products and services.
China is differentiating itself from its BRICS counterparts by seeking
more patent protection, achieving higher allowance rates, and exporting
more ATPs to the U.S. (see, for example, Figure A6).  While the increased
allowance rate suggests that Chinese patent applications have improved in
quality, we cannot authoritatively state that the patents are of genuinely
higher quality than earlier submissions by Chinese patent applicants until
these patents have survived challenges in post-grant proceedings or patent
75. See Hu & Jefferson, supra note 29.
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infringement lawsuits.  Confirmation by the USPTO of the enforceability of
these patents could encourage more innovation and patenting in China and
throughout Asia by assuring new participants in the global economy that
other influential governments will recognize and enforce their intellectual
property rights.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The innovations of Chinese industries have caught the attention of
global economic actors, making it likely that innovation in China will play a
critical role in the trade, policy, and business decisions of governments and
corporations.  It is our hope that the data and analyses in this work can in-
form those decisions and fuel further research in this area.  In this Article,
we use the data to explore whether China’s recent surge of patent activity is
an idiosyncratic event or if it follows established patterns.
The two sets of data we analyzed focus on the number of patent applica-
tions submitted to the USPTO, the allowance rate of these applications, and
the technology mix of these applications.  The first set of data compares
these figures for China, other BRICS countries, Japan, and South Korea
from 2000 to 2014.  The second set looks at China, India, and South Korea
during their respective ten-year periods of highest patent application growth.
Our analysis indicates that China is following patenting trends similar to
those exhibited by other East Asian countries, though at a more accelerated
pace.  Compared to other emerging BRICS economies, China is submitting
more patent applications, the subjects of the applications are more sophisti-
cated, and the patent allowance rate is more rapidly converging with that of
developed economies like South Korea and Japan.  China’s current patenting
trajectory is similar to other patent trends apparent from historical data, sug-
gesting that China is not following a unique developmental path.  If, how-
ever, we scale up the patterns observed during South Korea’s highest growth
period to China’s size and level of economic activity, the data suggest that
the growth observed in Chinese patent applications so far is only the begin-
ning.  Its patent application rates will probably continue to increase over the
next decade before starting to slow.
The increase in Chinese patenting activity is therefore not without pre-
cedent, but our results suggest that increased R&D expenditures and the in-
flux of foreign capital are more significant contributing factors that were not
present in the same concentrations in other high-growth economies, such as
South Korea.  Therefore, while these developments are not an anomaly, they
have also been enhanced by the nature of our increasingly globalized econ-
omy.  Exposure to foreign direct investment and multinational corporations
in China has contributed to a culture that accepts and relies on foreign intel-
lectual property protections.
88 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 22:53
Our work also distinguishes Chinese technological development from
more established economies by the geographic concentration of patenting
activity within China.  Increasingly, technological innovation is centered in
especially innovative geographic clusters in the U.S., Europe, Japan, South
Korea, and China.  Future research should focus not just on innovation
within a country as a whole, but also on innovation within observable clus-
ters of inventive activity within these countries.  In particular, our findings
raise the possibility that the global innovative city is becoming the new
model for sourcing technology innovation.
Future research should also explore factors responsible for rising patent
allowance rates, especially evaluating whether the increased allowance rates
are better explained by the effects of Chinese inventors becoming more fa-
miliar with the U.S. patent system or by increased collaboration with MNCs
already familiar with the U.S. patent system.  Other future work could sup-
plement the comparative data discussed in this Article with economic indica-
tors to examine where along the economic development spectrum this boom
in innovation occurs.  This type of analysis could potentially allow for pro-
jections of future patent booms.
In the future, U.S. patent litigation and licensing is likely to involve
many more Chinese-owned U.S. patents.  If the USPTO and courts uphold
the validity of these patents, it is safe to say that the Chinese pursuit of
patent protection in the U.S. is the new normal, cementing China’s status as
a global economic and innovative powerhouse.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE A1. CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY MIX OF APPLICATIONS FROM
CHINA AND VARIOUS COMPARISON GROUPS, 2000-02 TO 2010-2012
 
       Source: Authors’ calculations based on PALM data. 
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FIGURE A2. CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY MIX, INDIAN APPLICATIONS TO THE
USPTO, 1998-2008
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PALM data collected by the USPTO. 
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FIGURE A3. CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY MIX, SOUTH KOREAN APPLICATIONS
TO THE USPTO, 1986-1996
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PALM data from the USPTO. 
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FIGURE A4. GEOGRAPHIC MIX CONCENTRATIONS OF APPLICATIONS FROM
CHINA, 2000-2012
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the geographic data for patent applications originating from China  
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
He
rf
in
da
hl
 in
de
x 
FIGURE A5. THE NUMBER OF ANNUAL UTILITY PATENT APPLICATIONS
FROM SOUTH KOREA (1986-2011) AND FROM CHINA (1997-2011)
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FIGURE A6. SHARE OF TOTAL EXPORTS TO THE U.S. THAT ARE
CLASSIFIED AS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS (ATPS), CHINA AND
COMPARISON GROUPS, 2002-2012
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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